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Shifting Automotive Landscapes: Privacy and the 
Right to Travel in the Era of Autonomous  
Motor Vehicles 
Matthew Gillespie 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Travel, in the younger sort, is a part of education; in the elder, a 
part of experience.”1 Time has proven these words, penned by noted 
English attorney and philosopher Francis Bacon, immortal in their 
truth. While the ability to travel has always had unique social, 
political, and economic significance, the ability to move from place 
to place efficiently has never been as possible—or important—as it is 
today. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that 
the average American travels 36.1 miles, or for almost an hour and a 
half, every day.
2
 Given the importance of personal transportation to 
Americans, it is not surprising that the automotive industry is looking 
to autonomous technology to increase access and ease of 
transportation. 
As society becomes increasingly exposed to innovative 
transportation methods, particularly autonomous motor vehicles 
(AMVs), our nation’s policies are quickly showing themselves 
ineffective in addressing the issues of our modern age.
3
 United States 
 
 
 Matthew Gillespie, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, 2016. My 
eternal gratitude goes out to my wife, Kelsea, for her love, support, and feedback.  
 1. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (10th ed. 1919). Sir Francis Bacon was a 
noted Renaissance-era English philosopher and attorney. Jürgen Klein, Francis Bacon, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 29, 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ francis-bacon/. 
 2. Passenger Travel, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/publications/ 
passenger_travel/chapter2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 3. AMVs are also referred to as “driverless cars,” “self-driving cars,” or derivations 
thereof. This Note opts for the term “autonomous motor vehicles,” as this term more 
appropriately capture the fundamental nature and capabilities of these technologies. While 
terms like “driverless” or “self-driving” may have a certain appeal to a consumer base, the 
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jurisprudence regarding the fundamental right to travel, in particular, 
does not adequately respond to individuals’ modern need to have 
access to personal transportation.
4
 Today, personal transportation is 
nearly a prerequisite for numerous forms of employment, access to 
healthcare, and many other daily needs, and yet courts often refuse to 
protect the right to personal transportation.
5
 Similarly, a lack of 
privacy laws protecting information collected by motor vehicles 
(particularly AMVs) leaves both consumers and manufacturers 
uncertain of what limitations, if any, will be placed on these 
information-collecting practices.
6
 
It is up to our legislatures and judiciaries to respond to changing 
dynamics of personal transportation and its technologies. This Note 
proposes that our nation secure the “fundamental” right to travel in 
two steps.
7
 First, courts must abandon the single-mode doctrine. This 
doctrine entertains the legal fiction that as long as one form of 
transportation is available to an individual, their right to travel has not 
been infringed, and it erroneously fails to consider practicality.
8
 
Second, legislatures should adopt comprehensive protections of 
consumer privacy when information is collected through AMVs. By 
requiring anonymization of information collected, manufacturers can 
assure adequate consumer privacy while providing critical 
information to help develop safer technologies, regulations, and other 
practices.
9
 Without adequate privacy protections, consumers are 
forced to choose between forfeiting access to the outside world and 
 
potential for, and purpose of, these vehicles to operate autonomously is the definitive feature of 
these vehicles. 
 4. Throughout this Note, I use “personal transportation,” or a derivative of that phrase, to 
refer to one’s individual and independent access to a form of transportation that enables him or 
her to adequately and reasonably meet his or her daily needs. Some interpret this phrase more 
broadly to include any means of transportation by which an individual can control his or her 
destination and the means by which one arrives there. Although such a broad definition includes 
walking, biking, driving, and much more, my use of the phrase “personal transportation” in this 
Note does not include non-mechanized methods of transportation. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.A and accompanying sources. 
 6. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.1 and accompanying sources. 
 7. See sources cited infra note 12. 
 8. See sources cited infra note 34 and discussion infra Part II.A. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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subjecting themselves to personal privacy invasions, and the right to 
travel itself is threatened.
10
 
Context for these issues begins in Part II.A, which explores the 
early history and jurisprudence surrounding automobile regulations 
and the right to drive. Part II.B looks at the technological and cultural 
shifts AMVs bring to our social landscape, as well as privacy 
concerns emanating therefrom. In Part II.C, I look at modern privacy 
law, with particular emphasis on privacy law’s exponential 
convergence with the right to travel. Finally, Part III offers 
suggestions for judges and legislators alike for how to respond to the 
growing need brought by AMVs to clarify the rights of drivers. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Development of Automobile Regulations and the Right to 
Drive 
Despite a lack of publicity,
11
 the right to travel has long been 
acknowledged as a fundamental constitutional right by United States 
courts.
12
 The right to travel has undergone many transitions, 
particularly following the advent of the modern automobile, and has 
become steadily more qualified.
13
 While courts have unanimously 
agreed that a right to travel exists, the consensus surrounding the 
 
 10. See infra discussion at Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes. 
 11. See Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Note, Freedom of Movement at a Standstill? Toward the 
Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2461, 2462 (2010). 
The general ignorance of the “right to travel” is notable given its historical significance. The 
right dates back as early as the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 and was written about by 
both Sir William Blackstone and Thomas Jefferson. Richard Sobel, The Right to Travel and 
Privacy: Intersecting Fundamental Freedoms, 30 J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 639, 641 
(2014). 
 12. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 292 (1920) (“In all the states, from the 
beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed 
the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within 
the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free 
ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the states to forbid and 
punish violations of this fundamental right.”) (citing Corfeld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 
1823); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)). 
 13. See generally Roger I. Roots, The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by 
Automobile, 1890–1950, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 245 (2005). 
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doctrine seemingly stops there.
14
 Courts and commentators dispute 
not only the basis of the right to travel,
15
 but also its scope.
16
 This has 
resulted in an opaque right to travel doctrine. 
Courts generally acknowledge at least five subsumed rights 
included in the right to travel.
17
 Most pertinent of these subsumed 
rights to this Note are the rights to “interstate” and “intrastate” 
travel,
18
 which most directly address a motorist’s rights. Of these two 
rights, the Supreme Court has chosen to only rule on the former,
19
 
 
 14. The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed the right in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 220 (2015) (“A state law implicates the 
constitutional right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its 
primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of 
that right.”). 
 15. 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 220 (2015) (“The federal commerce power 
authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from violations of civil rights 
that impinge on their free movement in interstate commerce.”); 4A Ia. Prac., Criminal 
Procedure § 35:6 (2015) (“[A]t times, the right to travel ‘has been attributed to the Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment and to the Commerce 
Clause or has been inferred from the federal structure of government created by the Federal 
Constitution.’”); Timothy Baldwin, The Constitutional Right to Travel: Are Some Forms of 
Transportation More Equal than Others?, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 213 (2006) (“Many 
commentators have theorized that the framers assumed the language used in the Articles of 
Confederation was obviously implicit in the meaning of ‘Privileges and Immunities’ and did 
not need to be included in the Constitution.”); Andrew M. Schnitzel, Case Comment, Balancing 
Police Action Against an Underdeveloped Fundamental Right: Is There A Right to Travel 
Freely on Public Fora?, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 667, 672–73 (2009) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has ostensibly found the right to travel in seven different constitutional provisions). 
 16. While the Supreme Court has taken several occasions to discuss the right to interstate 
travel, the Court has explicitly declined to extend its rationale to intrastate travel. Baldwin, 
supra note 15, at 213. The result has been a mixed bag of appellate decisions on the existence 
and framework of a right to intrastate travel. See infra notes 17–28 and accompanying text. 
 17. The five rights subsumed under the general right to travel are: (1) the right to freedom 
of movement, (2) the right to travel on public fora, (3) the right to intrastate travel, (4) the right 
to interstate travel, and (5) the right to international travel. Schnitzel, supra note 15. Some have 
made unsuccessful attempts to extrapolate other rights from the general right to travel. See, e.g., 
Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975) (“right to commute”); Ector v. City of 
Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129, 514 P.2d 433 (1973) (same). 
 18. In its most basic definition, ‘interstate travel’ refers to “travel from one State to 
another, and necessarily to use [of] the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce in doing so.” By contrast, ‘intrastate travel’ contemplates movement within the 
borders of a single state. Intrastate travel “is an everyday right, a right we depend on to carry 
out our daily life activities. It is, at its core, a right of function.” Wilhelm, supra note 11, at 
2464. 
 19. Schnitzel, supra note 15, at 670–71 (“[T]he Court has never definitively addressed the 
existence of a right to intrastate travel, explicitly reserving the issue in the 1974 decision 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, [415 U.S. 250 (1975)] and not considering it since that 
decision.”). 
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leaving divergent rulings on the existence and extent of a right to 
intrastate travel amongst the circuits.
20
 The Court’s limited rulings on 
interstate travel, however, suggest a high level of deference to the 
right to travel, as the Court has consistently applied the strict scrutiny 
standard when determining whether a governmental restriction of the 
right is constitutional.
21
 Most recently, in an opinion penned by 
Justice Stevens, the Court outlined three protections vested in the 
right to travel: (1) the right of a citizen to enter and leave other states, 
(2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an 
unfriendly alien when in another state, and (3) the right to be treated 
like other citizens when an individual chooses to reside in another 
state.
22
 
Some appellate courts have arrived to the conclusion that the 
Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed: the rights to interstate 
and intrastate travel likely intersect.
23
 For example, the Second 
Circuit ruled in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority 
that it would be “meaningless” not to find a corresponding right to 
intrastate travel to the Supreme Court-affirmed right to interstate 
travel.
24
 Similarly, after an exhaustive analysis of the various 
constitutional bases for the right, the Third Circuit stated that “the 
right to move freely about one’s neighborhood or town, even by 
automobile, is indeed ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ and 
‘deeply rooted in our Nation’s history.’”25 Not all courts agree. The 
Fifth
26
 and Seventh
27
 Circuits have held that intrastate travel is 
 
 20. See infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Wilhelm, supra note 11, at 2465 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the right to interstate travel, including its classification as a “fundamental” right and 
the following application of strict scrutiny to governmental limitations thereof). 
 22. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). 
 23. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2002), but cf. Wardwell 
v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 24. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 25. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990). Notably, the Third Circuit 
ultimately held that the challenged “cruising ordinance” met its burden of satisfying 
intermediate scrutiny because the ordinance served a significant government objective. Id. at 
70. 
 26. Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 27. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. Miller, 405 
F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (refusing to affirm or deny a right to intrastate travel). 
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distinct from interstate travel due to divergent policy concerns.
28
 
Despite the high deference traditionally given to the right to travel 
generally, courts have consistently refused to establish a general right 
to drive.
29
 While the judiciary has acknowledged that motorists 
should not be impeded by arbitrary restrictions on their right to travel 
by vehicle,
30
 many courts have found that the right to travel does not 
avail itself to any particular form of travel or even to what is most 
convenient to the traveler.
31
 Therefore, driving regulations are not 
subject to the strict scrutiny standard applied to the right to interstate 
travel.
32
 As a result, travel by motor vehicles is encumbered by a 
barrage of regulations, controlling, inter alia, who can drive and how 
vehicles are driven.
33
 The negative doctrine stating that there is no 
 
 28. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713 (“Other decisions have held that there is no 
fundamental right to intrastate travel in the context of a bona fide residency requirement 
imposed as a condition of municipal employment.”) (emphasis in original). 
 29. Commentaries and case law are replete with instances in which courts have refused to 
establish a right to drive. See, e.g., Jeffrey Soll, Should California Prohibit Juvenile Driving: 
The Constitutional and Practical Considerations, 26 J. JUV. L. 49, 50 (“The courts have 
unanimously agreed that an individual does not have a fundamental right to operate a motor 
vehicle.”); Roots, supra note 13, at 267 (noting that traffic bureaus regularly refer to driving as 
a “privilege”). 
 30. 20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 304 (2015); see also Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 176–77 (1949) (discussing limitations in the search and seizure context). 
 31. In Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986), the Supreme Court 
held that the right to travel was implicated only when state law deters such travel, when 
impeding travel is the primary objective, or when state law uses a “classification which serves 
to penalize the exercise of that right.” Cf. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“[M]inor burdens impacting interstate travel . . . do not constitute a [constitutional] 
violation.”); Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1130 (W.D. Wash. 2005) 
(finding that individuals’ right to travel is not without governmental impediments); Gilmore v. 
Ashcroft, No. C02-3444 SI, 2004 WL 603530 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the right to travel 
does not include the right to use a particular form of travel); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 
1184, 1198 (noting that there is no right to the most convenient form of travel). See generally 
Baldwin, supra note 15, at 216; Soll, supra note 29, at 56. 
 32. See, e.g., Berberbian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977) (“The plaintiff's argument 
that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the 
fundamental right of interstate travel, is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented 
from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle 
driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel 
interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no 
hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right.”). 
 33. For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the right to travel, see 
Sobel, supra note 11; see also Carl Watner, A Short History of Highway and Vehicle 
Regulations, VOLUNTARYIST.COM (June 1998), http://voluntaryist.com/articles/092.html#. 
VCmSTytdXVs. 
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generally acknowledged right to use any particular mode of 
transportation has been referred to as the “single-mode doctrine.”34 
The single-mode doctrine has become a favored tool of the courts 
to overcome challenges to restrictions to particular modes of travel.
35
 
The Ninth Circuit in particular has used the single-mode doctrine to 
limit individuals’ right to drive,36 as well as to uphold airlines 
requiring photo identification to fly.
37
 Nonetheless, many courts have 
recognized that a particular form of transportation may offer 
individuals the only feasible means by traveling from one locale to 
another.
38
 As with intrastate travel, the Supreme Court has yet to rule 
substantively on this doctrine. 
It is important to note the historic context of the current 
divergence between constitutional rights to travel and the right to 
travel by automobile. Early right to travel jurisprudence was much 
less restrictive, with courts even acknowledging that the right to 
drive, rather than just the right to travel, is “fundamental.”39 
According to Professor Richard Sobel, the reasoning behind early 
courts’ desire for open borders was “based on the Founders' desire to 
structure a federal union under the Constitution to create a strong 
political union and a common market composed of sovereign 
states.”40 The right to travel was seen as a necessity that united the 
separate states politically, commercially, and socially.
41
  
 
 34. For an in depth discussion of the precedent and reasoning behind the lack of a right to 
choose a mode of transportation, see Baldwin, supra note 15, and Sobel, supra note 11, at 655–
60. 
 35. Sobel, supra note 11, at 655–60. 
 36. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d at 1205–06. 
 37. See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 38. E.g., Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1271 (D. Ore. 2014) (“While the 
Constitution does not ordinarily guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of 
transportation, given that other forms of travel usually remain possible, the fact remains that for 
international travel, air transport in these modern times is practically the only form of 
transportation, travel by ship being prohibitively expensive.”) (quoting Ibrahim v. Dept. of 
Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2012 WL 6652362 at *7 (C.D. Calif. 2012)); Sobel, 
supra note 11, at 658–60. 
 39. See, e.g., Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075, 1076 (Kan. 1890); City of Chicago v. 
Collins, 51 N.E. 907 (Ill. 1898) (discussing importance of right, though not expressly referred 
to as “fundamental”). 
 40. Sobel, supra note 11, at 648. 
 41. Id. at 648–49. 
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Today, the right to travel is, if anything, more critical to the 
functioning of society.
42
 Simple acts such as driving one’s own 
vehicle are often critical to employment,
43
 health care, and even 
maintaining family ties.
44
 In fact, narrow interpretations of the right 
to travel may have a disproportionately adverse impact on the 
nation’s poorest and most vulnerable populations.45  
Courts that favor a narrow interpretation of the right to travel—
either by holding that there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel 
or by upholding the single-mode doctrine—tend to have similar lines 
of reasoning: that the operation of a motor vehicle is a matter of state 
law,
46
 the right to travel is not being impeded as long as alternative 
modes of transportation are available,
47
 and the Supreme Court’s 
dismissal of intrastate travel cases for want of a federal question 
precludes consideration.
48
 Courts often find regulations on travel 
 
 42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Counterintuitively, the cited study notes that 
the average use of passenger vehicles has actually declined in the past decade or so. Id. Many 
factors outside the scope of this Note may have affected this decline, but personal transportation 
remains an important part of daily life for Americans. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying 
text. 
 43. BRIAN MCKENZIE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MODES LESS TRAVELED – BICYCLING AND 
WALKING TO WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 2008–2012 (May 2014), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/commuting/ files/2014/acs-25.pdf (noting that 86.2 percent of 
commuters drive to work); Baldwin, supra note 15, at 219 (noting that more than half of all 
American jobs are not accessible by public transportation). 
 44. D’vera Cohn & Rich Morin, Who Moves? Who Stays Put? Where’s Home?, 
PEWRESEARCH (Dec. 28, 2008), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/12/17/who-moves-who-
stays-put-wheres-home/ (noting that 38 percent of adults do not consider their residences to be 
“home,” and that most Americans have moved into a new community at least once). 
 45. The Ninth Circuit was unfazed by this implication in Monarch Travel Services, Inc. v. 
Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) ( “A rich man can choose to 
drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of 
travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”). Given the limitations of public 
transportation, which give access to less than half of the jobs in the United States and may not 
serve the odd hours many are required to work (see supra note 43), coupled with the fact that 90 
percent of welfare recipients do not have an automobile, the effect of this and like decisions are 
alarming. Baldwin, supra note 15. Baldwin also provides an insightful analysis of how the 
courts have ruled on right to travel plaintiffs with various socioeconomic backgrounds. Id. at 
240-43; see also Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of 
Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 649–56 
(1992) (discussing ways in which restrictions on the right to travel affect homeless 
populations). 
 46. E.g., Berberbian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977). 
 47. E.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 48. E.g., Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902–03 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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generally or on specific modes of transportation reasonably justified 
in the name of traffic safety,
49
 maintaining the peace,
50
 and tax 
collection.
51
 Nonetheless, an absence of conclusive Supreme Court 
rulings leaves right to travel jurisprudence, and particularly its 
application to automobiles, open to change. 
B. The Autonomous Motor Vehicle 
1. Generally 
In what could be one of the largest shakeups to personal 
transportation and the right to travel since the Model-T, some experts 
suggest that in as few as five years,
52
 AMVs may enter the 
marketplace, dramatically improving, inter alia, motor vehicle safety 
and commuter efficiency.
53
  
AMV technologies emerged in a relatively short length of time.
54
 
Sources point to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 
(DARPA) Grand Challenges in the mid-2000s as the birth of the 
active effort to develop AMV technologies.
55
 At these challenges, 
several teams from top universities competed to develop AMVs to 
 
 49. “It has been declared that the automobile is a source of danger, and capable of such a 
high rate of speed, and careless operation, that regulation is necessary to the public.” Xenophon 
P. Huddy, The Motor Car’s Status, 15 YALE L.J. 83 (1905). Doubtless to anyone that has driven 
in a major U.S. city, Huddy’s observation has proven more true than not! 
 50. Marcavage v. City of Phila., 778 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“[O]ne does not 
have boundless rights to travel where he pleases in a manner disruptive to public, permitted 
events.”). 
 51. “Burdens placed on travel generally, such as gasoline taxes, or minor burdens 
impacting interstate travel, such as toll roads, do not constitute a violation of that right, 
however.” Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d at 1205. 
 52. See Andrew P. Garza, Note, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age 
of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 588 (2012) (noting that several engineers 
have suggested that AMVs could be “road-ready” by 2020); Andrew R. Swanson, Note, 
“Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State Autonomous Vehicle Legislation and the Road to a 
National Regime, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2014) (also suggesting 2020 as a date for 
commercial availability). 
 53. Julia Goodrich, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS. L. 
REV. 265, 278–79 (2013) (noting the potential impact of a significant reduction in human error 
on current motor vehicle collision injuries, as well as potential effects on fuel efficiency and 
traffic congestion). 
 54. See infra note 57. 
 55. Swanson, supra note 52, at 1093–94; Garza, supra note 52, at 587. 
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navigate an obstacle course. The first time an AMV successfully 
navigated the course occurred in 2005.
56
 Since the DARPA 
competitions, AMV technology has grown exponentially—a 
trajectory likely to continue.
57
 Nearly every major car manufacturer 
has developed or is in the process of developing AMV-type 
technologies.
58
 Google, the Internet search-engine giant, is a leader in 
this emerging industry.
59
 
Over the course of just a few years, Google developed its own 
functional AMV prototype.
60
 As of this writing, Google’s iteration 
taps into the company’s extensive mapping database.61 Google’s 
mapping database allows its AMV technology to navigate public 
roadways by utilizing existing GPS technologies as well as a number 
of sensors and cameras (including a top-mounted “LiDAR” that 
rapidly spins 360 degrees) that continuously survey surroundings and 
potential hazards.
62
 
Due to the sudden growth of the industry, AMVs are rapidly 
outpacing current legal frameworks. As of late 2015, twenty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia have considered legislation 
“legalizing”63 AMVs to some degree, but only five states and the 
 
 56. Swanson, supra note 52, at 1093–94; Garza, supra note 52, at 587. 
 57. See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Driverless Car Tech Gets Serious, CNN (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/09/tech/innovation/self-driving-cars-ces/ (noting the recent 
development of AMV technologies by Audi and BMW); John Greenough, THE SELF-
DRIVING CAR REPORT: Forecasts, Tech Timelines, and the Benefits and Barriers That Will 
Impact Adoption, Bus. Insider (July 29, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/report-10-
million-self-driving-cars-will-be-on-the-road-by-2020-2015-5. 
 58. Kevin Lee, Driverless Cars Are Legal in California, so What Comes Next?, 
TECHRADAR (June 16, 2014), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/car-tech/the-stop-and-go-
story-of-legalizing-driverless-cars-1251056 (“[E]very major car manufacturer—from BMW to 
Nissan and Honda to Chrysler—have been working on their own technology and driving 
autonomous vehicles in a much less advertised fashion than Google.”). 
 59. See infra note 60. 
 60. See generally Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
selfdrivingcar/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
 61. Haydn Shaughnessy, Why Google Will Lose in Driverless Cars (And Who Will Win), 
Forbes (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/haydnshaughnessy/2013/02/04/why-google-
will-lose-in-driverless-cars-and-who-will-win/. 
 62. Garza, supra note 52, at 587–88; Swanson, supra note 52, at 1092–93. 
 63. There has been significant commentary on the degree to which AMVs are “legal.” For 
example, although regulations of driving are left to the states, the Department of Transportation 
has issued advisory opinions that driverless cars should only be allowed for testing at this time. 
John Ribeiro, Department of Transportation Says Driverless Cars Aren’t Ready for Prime 
Time, TECH HIVE (May 31, 2013), http://www.techhive.com/article/2040382/department-of-
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District of Columbia have passed legislation to that end.
64
 Between 
these states, legislation is inconsistent on critical issues, such as 
whether AMV manufacturers are civilly liable for cases resulting in 
damages.
65
 Some commentators expect that AMV regulation for 
commercial use will come in phases,
66
 particularly as public 
acceptance of AMVs becomes more widespread.  
 
transportation-says-driverless-cars-arent-ready-for-prime-time.html; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
(2013), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_ 
Policy.pdf. One commentator has explained that “driverless cars are not fully legal, but they’re 
also not illegal. It depends on the state, the level of autonomy in question and the various 
regulatory layers that stretch from a state-enforced law to a Federal one.” Nick Statt, Are 
Driverless Cars Legal?, READWRITE (May 31, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/05/31/so-wait-
are-driverless-cars-legal. See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably 
Legal in the United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014), for further discussion.  
 64. The states that have passed legislation to date are Michigan, Nevada, California, 
Florida and the District of Columbia. Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, 
CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_ 
Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter 
Automated Driving]. Compare the United States’ hesitancy to embrace AMVs to the United 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom has quickly responded to the potential benefits of driverless 
cars through favorable governmental steps. See Christine Mai-Duc, Britain Has Ambitious Plan 
for Driverless Cars, but Roadblocks Remain, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2014), http://www.latimes. 
com/world/worldnow/la-fg-uk-driverless-cars-regulations-20140730-story. html; U.K. DEP’T 
FOR TRANSPORT, THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS (Feb. 2015), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401562/pathway
-driverless-cars-summary.pdf [hereinafter THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS] (“In this 
review the Government has set out clear next steps showing how we will continue to ensure the 
regulatory and legislative framework is there to support the further development and mass 
production of automated vehicle technologies.”). 
 65. Automated Driving, supra note 64; Ryan S. Bewersdorf, Driverless Car Technology – 
Legislation Slow to Keep Pace, 18 NO. 4 CYBERSPACE LAW. 4 (2013) (noting that Michigan 
and Florida laws do not place civil liability on AMV manufacturers for resulting damages, 
whereas California and Nevada laws are silent on the issue). 
 66. E.g., THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS, supra note 64 (outlining timeline for 
regulatory and legislative actions in response to driverless car industry); Garza, supra note 52, 
at 588. Naturally, commentators disagree as to what these phases will look like. One simplified, 
but persuasive example comes from Andrew Garza: 
[G]rowth is likely to proceed in two phases: (1) a transition from manual cars to 
overridable autonomous vehicles (“OAV”); and (2) a shift to fully autonomous, 
nonoverridable vehicles when the distribution of OAVs greatly outnumbers manual 
cars. 
Garza, supra note 52, at 588. 
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AMV technology likely has a way to go before it will be deemed 
sufficiently safe to be welcomed by state legislatures.
67
 The public, 
however, is readier to embrace this new technology. A Cisco report 
stated that 57 percent of global consumers and 60 percent of US 
consumers “trust” AMVs.68 Some prognosticators predict that 75 
percent of vehicles on the road will be AMVs by 2040.
69
  
Given AMVs’ projected multitude of personal and societal 
benefits, these figures may be conservative. AMVs are anticipated to 
significantly reduce the likelihood of human error on the road, which 
figures show caused 95 percent of all collisions in 2008.
70
 
Additionally, average commute times may decline. The Department 
of Transportation estimates that the average American spends as long 
as 51 minutes a day simply commuting, a figure that will, 
theoretically, be significantly reduced by AMVs.
71
 Further, even the 
time spent in AMVs would be more productive than time spent in 
manual vehicles, as users could read, use phones, or even use laptops 
without fear of jeopardizing their or others’ safety.72 Finally, AMVs 
would give access to personal transportation of a vehicle to those 
 
 67. At the time of this writing, quite a few issues face the development of AMV 
technologies. The issues range widely from the philosophical, e.g., Erin Carson, 8 Truths and 
Myths of Driverless Cars, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.techrepublic.com/ 
article/8-truths-and-myths-of-driverless-cars/ (discussing Isaav Asimov’s laws of robotics), to 
the highly practical, see Goodrich, supra note 53, at 276 (discussing issues with driving in 
reverse). 
 68. Consumers Desire More Automated Automobiles, According to Cisco Study, CISCO 
SYS. (May 14, 2013), http://newsroom.cisco.com/press-release-content?articleId=1184392 
&type=webcontent; Statt, supra note 63. 
 69. Swanson, supra note 52, at 1094. 
 70. Goodrich, supra note 53, at 278; Driverless Cars . . . The Future is Already Here, 
AUTO INS. CENTER, http://www.autoinsurancecenter.com/driverless-cars...the-future-is-already-
here.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) (suggesting that AMVs could reduce motor vehicle 
fatalities by 99 percent); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL MOTOR 
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY (July 2008), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ 
Pubs/811059.PDF (estimating over two million of the 2.2 million motor vehicle crashes in 2008 
were attributable to driver error). 
 71. Goodrich, supra note 53, at 278–79; Swanson, supra note 52 at 1087–88. 
 72. Of course, regulatory schemes may not immediately allow for this benefit to be 
realized. Compare D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2013) (requiring AMVs to have “driver seated in the 
control seat of the vehicle while in operation who is prepared to take control of the autonomous 
vehicle at any moment”) with THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS, supra note 64 (discussing 
how drivers may “safely use the journey time however they wish, from reading a book to 
surfing the web, watching a film or just chatting face to face with other passengers”). 
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who currently are unable to use personal transportation, from the 
disabled to the young and elderly.
73
 
2. Privacy Concerns 
One great obstacle stands in the way of general acceptance of 
AMVs on our driveways and streets: privacy.
74
 Today, 96 percent of 
new cars contain event data recorders (EDRs) that store, but do not 
transmit, crash data such as vehicle speed, brake usage, seat-belt use, 
and airbag deployment in the seconds immediately before and after a 
collision.
75
  
California law currently requires AMVs to record vehicle 
operations information.
76
 Some fear that the law opens the door to 
transmission of drivers’ personal information to advertisers,77 
utilization of the same information by government or private entities 
in mass surveillance,
78
 or other privacy breaches.
79
  
These fears may not be entirely unfounded. Google, a primary 
AMV manufacturer and designer, was ensnared in controversy when 
 
 73. Goodrich, supra note 53, at 279; Dan McLaughlin, 17 Ways Driverless Cars Could 
Change America, FEDERALIST (July 16, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/07/16/17-ways-
driverless-cars-could-change-america/. It is also worth noting potential reductions in “drunk 
driving” fatalities. Ray Massey, Self-Driving Cars Hit UK Roads, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2947920/Self-driving-cars-given-green-light-UK-
Driverless-vehicles-BOOZE-CRUISE-control-drunk-motorists-future.html. 
 74. See generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1171 (2012). 
 75. A Car Black Box: How Your Car Is Tracking You, CONSUMER REPS. (July 2014), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/09/how-your-car-is-tracking-
you/index.htm [hereinafter CONSUMER REPS.]. 
 76. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2015); California Pushes to Finish Driverless Car 
Rules, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/03/ 
12/california-driverless-car-legislation/6321491/. 
 77. Matt Bigler, California Driverless Car Raises Privacy Concerns, CBS SF BAY AREA 
(Sept. 27, 2012, 5:45 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/09/27/california-driverless-
car-law-raises-privacy-concerns/. 
 78. Bianca Bosker, Google Self-Driving Cars Should Record Driver Moves Despite 
Privacy Fears, U.S. Official Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 7:33 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/google-self-driving-cars_n_3826413.html (“A poll 
released in June by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers found that around three-quarters 
of respondents feared driverless car-manufacturers would use their vehicles' software to record 
personal data, while 70 percent had concerns their data would be accessible by the 
government.”). 
 79. See generally Glancy, supra note 74. 
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reports exposed that Google collected and developed a database of 
users’ personal information, such as e-mails and passwords, and 
similarly “bypass[ed] privacy settings in Apple’s Safari browser and 
. . . maintain[ed]” a database of information on users of its 
services.”80 The following illustrates one author’s fears with regard to 
AMVs: 
In time, Google will know when you arrive at work each 
morning, how many times a week you go to Taco Bell, how 
long you spend at the gym. As illuminating as our searches and 
other online behavior might be, there’s still some room for 
ambiguity. Maybe you’re doing all those searches on “brain 
tumor” because a relative is sick, or you’re doing some sort of 
report, or you’re simply curious. Combine that info with the 
fact that you start visiting the hospital every week, however, 
and Google knows you’ve got cancer.81 
The validity of these concerns is not yet known, however, as it is 
unclear to what extent individuals will be tracked once AMVs are 
commercially available.
82
 Fortunately for privacy advocates, there is 
already some measure of protection of personal information in 
similar contexts at both the state and federal level.
83
 
 
 80. Greg Beato, Google’s Driverless Future, REASON (June 2013), http://reason.com/ 
archives/2013/05/10/googles-driverless-future. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Sharon Gaudin, Privacy Group Wants Google’s Driverless Cars Kept Off the Road, 
COMPUTERWORLD (May 30, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2503749/ 
data-privacy/privacy-group-wants-google-s-driverless-cars-kept-off-the-road.html. 
 83. Glancy, supra note 74, at 1201-03. 
Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have 
enacted such legislation that requires notification and remedial action if personal 
information is lost or disclosed through a data breach. . . . The Drivers' Privacy 
Protection Act (DPPA) applies nationwide to personal information required and 
processed by state departments of motor vehicles for licensing purposes. The DPPA 
imposes statutory damages for improper use or disclosure of personal information 
provided for the purposes of licensing drivers and vehicles. The statute protects 
specified categories of personal information, such as name and address, and provides 
even more protection for highly sensitive personal information, such as race. . . . 
Beginning almost ten years ago, a number of states began to enact legislation to restrict 
access to information recorded by EDRs. 
Id. But see discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  Shifting Automotive Landscapes 161 
 
 
C. The Modern Right to Privacy 
1. Technology 
The judiciary most often probes the right to privacy in the context 
of Fourth Amendment searches, where search limitations are 
measured by the existence of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”84 
One popular mode of analysis that courts use to determine whether 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information contained within modern technologies is the “binary 
conception.” Under the binary conception, a reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists only if no third parties have access to the 
information sought to be protected.
85
 The courts’ application of this 
standard to modern technologies, however, has frustrated some 
privacy advocates.
86
 Some posit that this approach can easily result in 
a discrepancy between what judges believe to be reasonable 
expectations of privacy and the public’s expectation of privacy.87 
The judiciary’s approach to cell phone privacy may illuminate the 
future of AMV privacy doctrines.
88
 Cell phones have been referred to 
 
 84. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 85. Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65 
S.C. L. REV. 373, 377 (2013). This article also discusses at length the “contextual conception” 
utilized by some courts and legislatures, a standard that determines reasonable expectations of 
privacy by inquiring into the circumstances in which the information was shared. Id. at 382–83. 
 86. See, e.g., Brandon T. Crowther, Comment, (Un)Reasonable Expectation of Digital 
Privacy, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (2012). 
 87. Crowther, supra note 86, at 350–51 (“In at least some instances, the [binary 
conception] serves as a substantial limitation on an individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In many cases, it can completely undermine what would appear to be a private 
situation, as in a discussion with a close friend . . . Four central problems have arisen with the 
advent of digital technology. These are (1) the increased gap between what level of privacy 
individuals expect in digital information and what society (i.e. a court) is willing to recognize as 
reasonable, (2) terms of service agreements that undermine significant privacy interests, (3) the 
enormous expansion of situations that implicate the [binary conception], and (4) a judiciary that 
lacks the technical expertise to effectively define digital privacy.”). 
 88. “Fights over privacy in the self-driving future will focus on many of the same issues 
that are currently being debated with regard to cellphones.” Timothy B. Lee, Self-Driving Cars 
Are a Privacy Nightmare. And It’s Totally Worth It., WASH. POST (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/21/self-driving-cars-are-a-privacy-
nightmare-and-its-totally-worth-it/; See also Craig Timberg, Web-Connected Cars Bring Privacy 
Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/ 
web-connected-cars-bring-privacy-concerns/2013/03/05/d935d990-80ea-11e2-a350-49866afab 
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as “the most privacy-invading device in the world today”89 for their 
ability to divulge users’ personal information to third parties.90 By 
using cell phone towers to triangulate a user’s location, sometimes as 
precisely as within fifty meters, geolocational tracking through cell 
phones has also become a favorite tool among many law enforcement 
agencies.
91
 Despite the highly personal nature of the modern cell 
phone, circuit courts have taken divergent approaches to protecting 
locational data from law enforcement agencies and other sources.
92
 
For example, the Eleventh and Third Circuits and several state courts 
require warrants for cell phone data, but the Fifth Circuit has held 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in such information.
93
 
Only recently did the Supreme Court clarify the issue, siding with 
privacy interests to hold that law enforcement officers must obtain a 
warrant before conducting a search of a cell phone.
94
 
Geolocation and other tracking concerns stem from more than just 
cell phones, however. In a world where in-vehicle technology is a 
significant selling point to consumers,
95
 the connectivity of vehicles 
is predicted to expand well beyond its current levels,
96
 even absent 
 
584_story.html (comparing the future connectivity of automobiles to “giant rolling 
smartphones”). 
 89. CONSUMER REPS., supra note 75 (quoting Fred Cate, director of the Center for 
Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana University). 
 90. See Theodore F. Claypoole & Richard C. Balough, Developments in the Law 
Concerning Geolocational Privacy, 68 BUS. LAW. 197, 199–200 (2012). 
 91. Scott W. Turner, GPS Surveillance, the Right to Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 
40 COLO. LAW. 55, 56–57; see also Location Tracking, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) 
(noting the preponderance of law enforcement agencies that regularly use cell phone 
geolocational tracking). 
 92. Turner, supra note 91, at 56–57. 
 93. Id.; see also United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928, 573 Fed.Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 
2014); Jacob Krastrenakes, Warrantless Cellphone Location Tracking Is Illegal, US Circuit 
Rules, VERGE (June 11, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/11/5801238/ 
warrantless-cellphone-location-tracking-illegal-us-court-rules. 
 94. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 95. Craig Trudell, Mulally: Auto Industry Needs Privacy Boundaries Set by Law, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140114/ 
OEM06/301149857/mulally:-auto-industry-needs-privacy-boundaries-set-by-law (“In-vehicle 
technology is the top selling point for 39 percent of car buyers today, more than twice the 14 
percent who say their first consideration is traditional performance measures such as power and 
speed, according to a study that consulting firm Accenture released in December.”). 
 96. “The number of cars connected to the Internet worldwide will grow more than sixfold 
to 152 million in 2020 from 23 million now, according to researcher IHS Automotive.” Id.; 
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the introduction of AMVs. In many ways, geolocation is already a 
major part of modern driving and regulation.
97
 Though the courts and 
Congress have attempted to protect drivers from unauthorized 
tracking,
98
 up to 68 percent of consumers remain concerned about 
privacy and data collection.
99
 
2. Converging Travel and Privacy Rights 
While in previous generations the rights to privacy and travel 
could be framed independently, AMVs highlight the manner in which 
the two rights are increasingly convergent. Insufficient protections of 
drivers’ rights to privacy could deter AMV-based travel.100 Professor 
Richard Sobel characterized this fundamental intersection as such: 
[A]n individual moving around has the right to be private and 
anonymous in his or her affairs, free from government 
intrusion. Hence, the demand for identification, without 
probable cause that the individual is engaging in an illegal 
activity, interferes not only with privacy, but also with travel 
 
Timberg, supra note 88 (predicting that 60 percent of vehicles will be connected to the Internet 
by 2017). 
 97. Claypoole & Balough, supra note 90, at 197; see also Justin P. Webb, Note, Car-ving 
out Notions of Privacy: The Impact of GPS Tracking and Why Maynard Is a Move in the Right 
Direction, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 788 (2012) (discussing the need for a modernized GPS 
structure); Phillip Swarts, Is Your Car Spying on You? GPS Tracks ‘Consumers,’ Identity Theft 
at Risk, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/7/no-
privacy-behind-the-wheel-your-car-might-be-spyi/?page=all (noting that all major car 
manufacturers track driving information but that manufacturers’ policies are unclear). 
 98. Claypoole & Balough, supra note 90, at 198, 200 (discussing the effect of United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and subsequent court rulings on vehicle geolocational 
tracking); Kate Kaye, Does Your Car Need a Privacy Policy? The AAA Says, Yes, 
ADVERTISING AGE (Jan. 16, 2014), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/car-a-
privacy-policy-aaa/291133/ (discussing the proposed Driver’s Privacy bill seeking to address 
consumer tracking concerns). 
 99. Kaye, supra note 98; see also Joseph B. White, The Big Worry About Driverless 
Cars? Losing Privacy, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-
seat/2013/06/03/the-big-worry-about-driverless-cars-losing-privacy/ (“About 75% of respondents 
[to a poll regarding AMVs] said they were concerned that companies would use the software 
that controls a self-driving car to collect personal data, and 70% were worried that data would 
be shared with the government. Asked whether they were worried that hackers could gain 
control of a self-driving vehicle, 81% of the respondents replied they were either very or 
somewhat concerned about that threat, the Alliance says.”). 
 100. See White, supra note 99 (discussing drivers’ inhibitions to use AMVs without 
suitable privacy protections). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 50:147 
 
 
rights. In short, the travel right entails the right to privacy, and 
it encompasses freedom to travel anonymously and free from 
governmental infringement. . . . In the concurrent exercise of 
two fundamental rights, one right, for example travel (or 
employment, often travel-related), may not be conditioned on 
abrogating another right like privacy.
101
 
Indeed, this intersection of rights has manifested in a multitude of 
ways, often through the use of the single-mode doctrine.
102
 
Restrictions on both the rights to privacy and travel include requiring 
identification to travel, full-body scans and pat-downs, as well as 
watch-lists and no-fly designations.
103
 For these reasons, it has 
become increasingly difficult to discuss the right to travel 
independently of privacy doctrines, particularly with modern modes 
of transportation and AMVs. 
III. ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL. 
AMVs will and should shift the jurisprudential landscape for the 
right to privacy and the right to travel. AMVs are unique among 
major innovations to transportation in that they have the potential to 
provide personal transportation to nearly everyone without fear of 
increased risk of harm based on mental or physical capacities, skill, 
or other individual-dependent factors. In this way, AMVs offer a 
level of independence to many in a manner not seen since the advent 
of affordable, personal vehicles. AMVs also offer the opportunity for 
safety to be standardized. Given that 95 percent of collisions occur 
 
 101. Sobel, supra note 11, at 652–53 (emphasis added). To illustrate his point, Professor 
Sobel cites two Supreme Court cases: Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), and Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004). Id. at 651–52. In the former, the 
Supreme Court held that a law requiring loiterers to provide identification at police request was 
unconstitutional due to vagueness. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated that even if the 
law had not been vague, it would have still been ruled unconstitutional. Sobel extrapolates 
Brennan’s concurrence to stand for the premise that “the Kolender court struck down the 
requirement to provide identification when involved in legal behavior.” Sobel, supra note 11, at 
652. Hiibel similarly involved a state statute that required identification on police request, and 
the Court concluded that reasonable suspicion and a state statute requiring identification were 
conditions to police requiring individuals provide identification. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185.  
 102. Sobel, supra note 11, at 660–65. For a reminder of what the single-mode doctrine 
upholds, see supra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
 103. Id. at 660 (discussing restrictions on air travel). 
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due to human error,
104
 it is reasonable to conclude that the biggest 
factor in automotive safety is the relative skill and diligence of any 
particular driver and of those drivers surrounding them. AMVs 
potentially eliminate skill and competence as factors that may lead to 
a collision, making all AMVs and driver safety essentially equal and 
ensuring more safety on the road. Finally, the ability of motorists to 
use travel time productively (or for other purposes) will likely have 
numerous, unpredictable benefits on society.
105
 Despite this potential, 
many courts still hold that there is no right to a particular mode of 
transportation.
106
 Given the drastic change in the transportation 
landscape, such approaches—like the single-mode doctrine—are 
outdated. 
Policy reasons alone command that legislatures revisit 
transportation policies. AMVs will eliminate, or at least significantly 
reduce, many of the policy arguments in favor of restricting the use 
or availability of personal transportation. Whereas concern for public 
safety and the public well-being originally compelled legislatures and 
municipalities to adopt driving restrictions based on factors such as 
age, eyesight, levels of intoxication, and numerous other 
considerations, AMVs likely make such concerns irrelevant. Indeed, 
by recognizing that these concerns are irrelevant, to the extent drivers 
cannot override or otherwise control AMVs when en route to a 
destination,
107
 AMVs should be made available to everyone. This 
mass availability would potentially open the door for hundreds of 
thousands of underage, disabled, and otherwise impaired citizens to 
have access to personal transportation currently unavailable to them. 
In this way, AMV users should be restricted no more than patrons of 
taxis, Uber, Lyft, or similar services. 
 
 104. See Goodrich, supra note 70. 
 105. See supra note 72. 
 106. See supra discussion Part II.A. 
 107. Since AMV technology is still in a state of flux, it is impossible to offer more than 
mere conjecture as to how much individual authority over a vehicle a driver will have. For 
illustrative purposes, I assume that at some point, fully automated vehicles akin to some current 
train systems will be available. However, I concede that existing restrictions on who is allowed 
to operate a motor vehicle may need to correspond with the level of control individual drivers 
have over their vehicle. See supra note 72. 
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As state interests in restricting and regulating personal 
transportation diminish as technology continues to improve, we are 
tasked with recognizing that each individual has an inherent right to 
“drive.”108 The importance of personal transportation has only 
increased and will continue to do so.
109
 Personal transportation has a 
significant impact on the quality of life of individuals, as it is often 
necessary for employment, healthcare, and other basic needs of an 
individual.
110
 For many, there are no feasible alternatives to personal 
transportation.
111
  
For this reason, the single-mode doctrine is woefully inadequate 
and should be abandoned by the courts for both inter- and intrastate 
travel. By holding that as long as any means of transportation exists, 
any fundamental right to travel is not infringed, courts entertain a 
legal fiction that all modes of transportation are equal or, at the very 
least, attainable. The inequitable nature of this ruling is particularly 
prominent when the relative economic capabilities of individuals is 
considered: under the single-mode doctrine, poorer Americans are, 
effectively, afforded less access to transportation by virtue of their 
lacking the ability to access and afford alternative modes of 
transportation.
112
 While this will always be true to some extent, courts 
should not use this argument to justify regulations only ostensibly 
related to the state’s purported interests. Recognizing that some form 
of individual, personal transportation is becoming more and more of 
 
 108. The term “drive” is used loosely here. Riders of AMVs may not drive the vehicle 
anymore than a customer drives a taxi or a rider drives a subway car. 
 109. See supra discussion Part II.A. 
 110. See supra note 45 for a discussion on the potential class aspects of transportation 
restrictions. 
 111. Although public transportation has many advantages and works well for many in a 
variety of circumstances, it poses significant practical challenges for many. Particularly for 
those who live in less populated areas or who work in suburban areas, public transportation may 
not meet their needs. For a thorough look at some of the challenges posed by public 
transportation and threatening public transportation utility in the future, see BRENDON HEMILY, 
TRENDS AFFECTING PUBLIC TRANSIT’S EFFECTIVENESS: A REVIEW AND PROPOSED ACTIONS 
(2004); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 43. 
 112. It is worth noting that some of these effects may not be immediately felt; initial costs 
for autonomous technology are likely to be high, but as the technology becomes more 
widespread and safety advances are realized, it will become increasingly likely that 
governmental entities around the world will encourage growth in this industry through subsidies 
or other incentives. Further, elimination of driver costs would increase profitability and utility 
for taxi and ride sharing services such as Uber and Lyft. 
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a basic need, the conclusion that regulations of each mode of 
transportation should be assessed on their own merits rather than on a 
relative basis is nearly compelled. Continued application of the 
single-mode doctrine only reinforces inequalities of access by 
potentially forcing those without resources to utilize impractical 
alternatives. 
Abandoning the single-mode doctrine would finally bring travel 
jurisprudence in line with the historical importance placed on the 
right to travel. Further, abandoning the single-mode doctrine would 
be consistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings on interstate travel up 
to this point, which has been deferential of the right to travel. As 
such, courts should abandon the single-mode doctrine, and rights to 
personal transportation should be affirmatively recognized. 
Of course, any recognized right to drive cannot and should not be 
absolute. The strict scrutiny test applied by the Supreme Court in 
interstate travel cases should similarly be applied not only to 
intrastate travel, but also to the right to drive, allotting the appropriate 
deference to the right to drive while balancing a need for some level 
of regulation of AMVs and their use. 
Unfortunately, recognition of the right to drive may be insufficient 
to ensure that an individual’s right to travel is protected. To 
paraphrase Professor Richard Sobel, conditioning one right on the 
infringement of another in such a way is inequitable, and undermines 
both rights.
113
 To fully protect personal transportation and travel 
rights, current privacy laws must ensure protection of consumer 
information obtained by AMVs. 
Due to ambiguous privacy laws that cause confusion among 
consumers, as well as vehicle manufacturers and distributors, state 
legislatures and Congress must develop a comprehensive scheme for 
privacy protection in AMVs. The scheme should determine what 
driver information can be collected, how it is collected, what the 
information is used for, who it is distributed to, and under what 
conditions it is distributed. One specific element of this scheme 
should be anonymization. As advocated for by Professor Dorothy 
Glancy, anonymization provides a compromise between those that 
 
 113. Sobel, supra note 11, at 653. 
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wish to travel in absolute privacy and those who want to use acquired 
information for commercial or safety purposes.
114
 Anonymous, 
encrypted information provides critical safety and user information to 
governmental and other sources, which may be used in the 
development of policies and technologies. This information also 
ensures that individuals’ private information is not linked to them. 
This scheme should also carry sufficient enforcement powers. 
Entities seeking to use the information provided by AMV technology 
should be overseen and regulated by an impartial third party. 
A privacy scheme for AMVs prays for distinction from that of 
other technologies, such as the oft-compared cellphone. If privacy 
protections similar to cellphone privacy laws were applied to AMVs, 
any anonymitization would be undermined by the constant threat of 
real-time geolocational data collection, which could be used to reveal 
the identity of almost any particular driver with reasonable certainty. 
Both cellphones and motor vehicles have the potential to be very 
personal, and many see either or both as private sanctuaries. 
Nonetheless, AMVs beg for more protection, on the offset, due to the 
inherently different nature of the two tools. Cellphones and many 
other technologies are used, primarily, as tools to communicate with 
the outside world. This use provides a lower expectation of privacy 
for the user, and compromised phones can be easily replaced or 
discarded. In contrast, motor vehicles generally are not adopted with 
an assumption of outside communication, and are significant 
investments on behalf of the owner. Such rules are consistent with 
even some of the least privacy-minded Fourth Amendment rulings. 
The increasingly fundamental need for personal transportation also 
underpins the need for more immediate privacy protections on the 
offset of AMVs in the marketplace.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Travel is a facet of our lives that is constantly changing, 
improving access to the world in ways never before seen. It is 
reasonable, then, that as major innovations are introduced to the 
public, our existing legal frameworks to address society’s needs are 
 
 114. See generally Glancy, supra note 74. 
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questioned and reassessed. It is a mistake continually made by 
legislatures and courts to treat privacy and general regulatory 
schemes as distinct issues. The advent of AMVs offers a unique 
opportunity for government to “get it right” by enacting a 
comprehensive scheme recognizing that personal transportation is 
becoming an increasingly fundamental need, and that in order to 
protect the right to access to such transportation, privacy rights must 
be defined and adequately enforced. 
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